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The world is resorting to the Internet of Things for ease of control and monitoring of smart
devices. The ubiquitous use of the Internet of Things ranges from Industrial Control Systems to
e-Health, e-Commerce, smart cities, supply chain management, smart cars, and a lot more. Such
reliance on the Internet of Things is resulting in a significant amount of data to be generated,
collected, processed, and analyzed. The big data analytics is no doubt beneficial for business
development. However, at the same time, numerous threats such as attacks on message and device
integrity, the vulnerability of end-devices to malware attacks, physical compromise of devices,
and threats to user data security and privacy pose a great danger to the sustenance of Internet of
Things. Therefore, it is the need of the hour to develop a security mechanism for the Internet of
Things systems to ensure the integrity and privacy of data being processed by these systems.
This study thus endeavors to highlight most of the known threats at various layers of the
Internet of Things architecture with a focus on the anatomy of some of the significant attacks.
The research also construes a detailed attack methodology adopted by some of the most
successful malware attacks on the Internet of Things, including Industrial Control Systems and
Cyber Physical Systems. The study further infers an attack strategy of a Distributed Denial of
Service attack through the Internet of Things botnet followed by requisite security measures. The
illustration of attack methodologies is followed by a composite guideline for the development of
an Internet of Things security framework based on industry best practices.
Sequel to the Internet of Things threat modeling, this research investigates the use of
blockchain technology to protect the Internet of Things against data integrity and privacy attacks.
Hence, to arrive at intelligible conclusions, a systematic study of the peculiarities of the Internet
of Things environment, including its security and performance requirements and progression in
blockchain technologies, is carried out. Moreover, this thesis also identifies unique challenges to
blockchain's adoption in the Internet of Things and recommends a possible way forward.
Based on a systematic and analytical review of blockchain technology, this study proposes a
privacy-preserving and secure data sharing framework for smart cities. The proposed scheme
preserves user data privacy by dividing the blockchain network into various channels, where
every channel comprises a finite number of authorized organizations and processes a specific type
of data such as health, smart car, smart energy, or financial details. Moreover, access to users'
data within a channel is controlled by embedding access control rules in the smart contracts. The
devised solution also conforms to some of the essential requirements outlined in the European
Union General Data Protection Regulation.
Another important contribution of this work is the conception and design of a novel Internet
of Things centric consensus protocol with the Internet of Things focused transaction validation
rules. The proposed Proof-of-Honesty consensus protocol not only reduces the possibility of
Byzantine behavior by block proposers (validator/mining nodes) during the consensus process
but is also scalable with low communication complexity. It is believed that the proposed
consensus protocol will prove to be a governing factor for the Internet of Things systems
considering to adopt blockchain technology.
Correspondingly, the main conclusion of this research and evaluation is that a sensibly
selected and carefully designed blockchain-based IoT application can provide some assurance to
the users concerning the security and privacy of their data. In this context, the focus should be on
developing an IoT-centric consensus protocol with an intelligent misbehavior detection
mechanism to detect and identify malicious miner/validator nodes. Moreover, validation of IoT
devices’ integrity is also an open challenge that requires due attention.
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